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IN RECENT YEARS, THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE COUNCIL
of the European Union became the focus of interest for an growing
number of scholars. However, it appears to be difficult to achieve the
degree of detailed information that is needed to understand how this
institution takes its decisions, and it seems to be difficult to obtain
specialized knowledge about what really goes on behind the Coun-
cil’s closed doors. Yet such information on actors’ policy positions
would represent crucial input for studies that attempt to test explana-
tory models of how the Council takes its decisions.1 The focus of
interest for research on EU politics should not be limited to further
analyses of existing data. New research in the field should rather
attempt to increase our knowledge of the formal and informal pro-
cesses of Council decision-making by improving data quality.2 Such
information could then be used both to assess performance of exist-
ing models and to create better theoretical frameworks for under-
standing how the European Union works. New data-generation
techniques could therefore open up a completely new dimension for
research in this field.3
1 Robert Thomson, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen and Thomas König
(eds), The European Union Decides, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
2 Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, ‘Old Rules, New Game: Decision-
Making in the Council of Ministers After the 2004 Enlargement’, CEPS Special Report,
March 2007, p. 2.
3 Jonathan Sullivan and Torsten J. Selck, ‘Political Preferences, Revealed Positions
and Strategic Votes: Explaining Decision-Making in the EU Council’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 14: 7 (2007), pp. 1150–61.
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Jonathan Sullivan and Tim Veen,4 in a review article recently
published in this journal, address this challenge. They argue that
data-generation processes for studies of decision-making in the EU
Council might be significantly improved by linking EU documents
with text analytical tools. The authors aim at ‘shedding light’ on the
Council, which they label an ‘opaque institution’.5 They refer to the
weaknesses of the two main approaches in the field, applied theoreti-
cal models and voting studies. According to Sullivan and Veen, exist-
ing weaknesses could be overcome through improved data quality
resulting from the application of new methods of data-gathering.
They first provide a brief review of the state of affairs in the literature
by comparing formal bargaining models and voting models of
Council decision-making. Both methods, they assert, have problems
regarding their explanatory power that are ‘the result of difficulties
researchers have faced in generating appropriate data’.6 Sullivan and
Veen then suggest that researchers might benefit from two recent
developments: an increasing availability of primary sources (e.g.
Council minutes, Eur-Lex, etc.) and the possibility of applying new
data-generation techniques based on document analysis.
Although Sullivan and Veen’s article attempts to introduce new
ways of studying decision-making in the Council, it falls short of
spelling out what type of data to use to enable researchers to employ
these techniques. Despite their increasing availability, the sole use of
EU primary sources is still too limited to conduct quantitative studies
oriented towards testing bargaining models, because they do not
report on the actors’ policy positions. Our article demonstrates which
other textual resources might be used. To fill the gap in the litera-
ture, we suggest the use of newspaper analysis. EU-related studies
hitherto only use newspapers to investigate the bias of media on
political behaviour of the European public, for example citizens’
attitudes towards the EU and European integration, or the develop-
ment of a European public sphere.7 In contrast to these approaches,
we regard newspapers as a proxy of what really happened during the
4 Jonathan Sullivan and Tim Veen, ‘The EU Council: Shedding Light on an
Opaque Institution’, Government and Opposition, 44: 1 (2009), pp. 113–23.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p. 118.
7 See e.g. Holli A. Semetko, Wouter van der Brug and Patti M. Valkenburg, ‘The
Influence of Political Events on Attitudes Towards the European Union’, British Journal
of Political Science, 33: 4 (2003), pp. 621–34; and Hans-Jörg Trenz, ‘Media Coverage of
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bargaining process. Newspapers are a readily available body of non-
political text and are a sustainable source of information to derive the
policy positions of political actors.8 We suggest linking procedural
information issued by the EU Council and the other institutional
actors with data gained from newspapers to enhance data quality.
Improved data on changes in actor positions will help us to under-
stand better the bargaining and voting processes in the Council and
EU politics in general.
Various formal models of EU decision-making have been devel-
oped, yielding a remarkable degree of sophistication in the theoreti-
cal literature. Empirical testing, however, as suggested by Hörl et al.,
has largely been unsuccessful.9 For models that were empirically
evaluated, a substantial mismatch between theoretical predictions
and empirical outcomes has been observed, possibly because of a lack
of accurate data. Overall, formal studies on EU decision-making
suffer both from a scarcity of empirical testing designs and from poor
model fit.10
Most of the decision-making models that have been put forward to
study the EU are based on rational choice theory. The models assume
that all the actors involved in a bargaining situation seek to further
their own interests. These in turn determine their negotiating beha-
viour. Linking the two stages of first negotiating a bill and then voting
on it in the Council would require information on the actors’ policy
preferences. Voting studies only take into account the final stage of
the decision-making process. They neglect both actors’ preferences
and their initial strategic positions and disregard the extent to which
these might have changed during the course of the bargaining
process. Hence these studies do not explain whether and to what
extent voting outcomes are affected by bargaining dynamics. In
order to link these two, information is needed about actors’ ideal
European Governance; Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality
Newspapers’, European Journal of Communication, 19: 3 (2004), pp. 291–319.
8 Jan Kleinnijenhuis and Paul Pennings, ‘Measurement of Party Positions on the
Basis of Party Programmes, Media Coverage and Voter Perceptions’, in Michael Laver
(ed.), Estimating the Policy Position of Political Actors, London, Routledge, 2001,
pp. 162–82.
9 Björn Hörl, Andreas Warntjern and Arndt Wonka, ‘Built on Quick Sand?
A Decade of Procedural Spatial Models on EU Legislative Decision-Making’, Journal
of European Public Policy, 12: 3 (2005), p. 593.
10 Sullivan and Selck, ‘Political Preferences’, p. 1151.
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preferences, their revealed positions, the strategies involved (e.g.
issue linkage) and their eventual voting behaviour. Only if this type of
information is available will it be possible to test rational choice
models of Council decision-making and to put forward theories
informed by both the bargaining and the final voting stages.
Sullivan and Veen refer to the increasing availability of primary
documents issued by the EU itself as a promising way of generating
new data. It is true that the European Parliament and the Council are
subject to increased transparency.11 Two important sources of legis-
lative process data issued by the institutions are the Council’s Public
Register and the database Eur-Lex.12 The Council’s Public Register
comprises the Council minutes, which record how the individual
member states voted on legal acts put before the Council. These
minutes, as pointed out by Hagemann,13 provide information on a
large number of procedural detail: the type of legal procedure, the
introduction date of the bill, the adoption date, the policy area, the
involvement of preparatory bodies and the Commission, the title of
the proposal, details about the policy content, the inter-institutional
reference number, the Sectoral Council, the stage of the legislative
process when the vote was taken, the stage of the legislative process
when the proposal was adopted, the identity of the member holding
the presidency, each member state’s decision to support, abstain, or
oppose a bill, and even formal statements added by individual states.
The Public Register also provides monthly summaries of the Council
acts. These include details about the legislative acts adopted, the
applied voting rule and the results of the voting. Apart from the
Council’s Public Register, the Eur-Lex database is a legal database
that reports on inter-institutional procedures.14
These online resources undoubtedly provide valuable information
on the EU legislative process. However, the Council’s Public Register
only provides summaries of the decisions taken. In most cases these
are no longer than two sentences at most, and do not represent
transcripts of the discussions. The information in Eur-Lex refers to
the application of particular procedures, voting rules in specific
sectors and general trends about the number or type of legislative
11 See Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001.
12 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/index.htm.
13 Sara Hagemann, ‘Applying Ideal Point Estimation Methods to the Council of
Ministers’, European Union Politics, 8: 2 (2007), pp. 282–3.
14 Sullivan and Veen, ‘The EU Council’, p. 119.
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decisions over time.15 Both sources lack information regarding
member states’ policy preferences and how these have shifted over
time, and are therefore inadequate to test bargaining models.
In addition to the described sources, we suggest the systematic
use of newspaper articles to identify and track the policy positions of
the EU members represented in the Council. Newspapers offer a vast
body of non-political text on the EU legislative processes.16 They can
be used to reveal details of the day-to-day decision-making processes
in the Union, thereby filling the gap left by relying too heavily on
the textual sources that have previously been employed in the litera-
ture. While national newspapers have undoubtedly the potential to
present different versions of national bargaining positions, most of
them report rather sporadically on the EU decision-making process.
We therefore suggest focusing on those newspapers that specifically
concentrate on the daily workings of the Union. Some of the most
prominent of these are Agence Europe, the ‘Brussels’ section of the
Financial Times, Europolitics and the Economist Group’s European Voice.
If newspaper articles – coupled with procedural information taken
from primary documents issued by the EU institutions – were to be
analysed by means of electronic content analysis, a hitherto unknown
depth of understanding of the internal dynamics of the EU decision-
making processes could be achieved.
The application of analysis of newspapers faces several challenges.
So far, political studies that apply newspaper analysis to EU affairs
have mainly done so by manually collecting relevant articles and by
more often than not failing to spell out what precisely the sampling
strategy was. This selection is prone to bias since it is based on an
often-subjective distinction between important and less important
cases. The literature on lawmaking in the US Congress has been
facing similar challenges and can provide useful guidelines for iden-
tifying and selecting cases. David R. Mayhew has defined legal acts
as important when they are both ‘innovative’ and ‘consequential’.17
15 Thomas König, Brooke Luetgert and Tanja Dannwolf, ‘Quantifying European
Legislative Research: Using CELEX and PreLex in EU Legislative Studies’, European
Union Politics, 7: 4 (2006), p. 554.
16 Note that ‘non-political’ does not mean that these are unbiased. We merely use
the term here to differentiate newspaper reporting from political text such as party
manifestos and political speeches.
17 David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-Making and Investigations
1946–1990, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1991, p. 37.
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Judgements of observers and participants in the process can be used
to indicate the extent to which an act is innovative and consequential,
and hence important.18 Another indicator refers to whether – and if
so, how often – the negotiations surrounding a particular legal act
are covered by major media outlets.19
A further issue regarding newspaper coverage of political affairs
concerns objectivity. Recent work in this field, focusing on the US
media market, discusses bias and how it can be overcome.20 Mullain-
athan and Shleifer discuss possibilities for gaining unbiased infor-
mation from newspapers. They suggest that a hypothetical reader
who reads many different newspapers’ coverage of the same event
should get a fairly objective idea of what ‘actually happened’. The
different media sources would offset each other, and a relatively
unbiased aggregate outcome should occur as a result.21 Following this
reasoning, newspaper-based text analysis should include as many
different newspapers as possible in order to approach objectivity. In
the context of the EU decision-making process, this means that
studies should not solely be based on single EU bulletins; in order to
circumvent bias, it would be crucial to include other newspaper
sources too. If applied properly, newspaper analysis is able to over-
come problems that are sometimes associated with it. It has the
potential to provide the type of valid and reliable data that is needed
to improve model-testing and our understanding of EU affairs.
The example of the EU Services Directive helps to illustrate the
benefits of employing newspaper analysis for gaining information on
the EU bargaining process. We chose this directive because many
observers, participants and journalists alike, have declared it to be one
of the most crucial EU legal acts ever negotiated. Arlene McCarthy,
an MEP, referred to it as ‘the single most important and most
disputed piece of legislation in the EU’.22 During the Finnish EU
presidency, Trade and Industry Minister Mauri Pekkarinen praised
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Matthew Gentzhow and Jesse M. Shapiro, ‘What Drives Media Slant? Evidence
from U.S. Daily Newspapers’, 13 November 2006, at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=947640, p. 5.
21 Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Market for News’, 30 December
2003, at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=485724.
22 http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/parliament-concurs-council-
services-directive/article-159730.
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the compromise on this directive as ‘historic’. Internal Market
Commissioner CharlieMcCreevy stressed the importance of the direc-
tive for all EU citizens and businesses.23 The salience of the Services
Directive also becomes apparent through the number of articles
published in the Economist newspaper, which ran no fewer than 48
articles on this single measure. The Services Directive aims at further
liberalizing the internal market for the European service sector. It
allows service providers to offer their services in any country of the
EU without facing any legal or administrative barriers. At the heart
of the directive are two fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EC
Treaty: the freedom to establishment and the freedom to provide
services.24 The negotiation and adoption of the Services Directive was
a long and arduous process. However, it was not a secretive one.
Newspapers reported extensively on the actors’ preferences, their
expectations, the choices they made, the obstacles that needed to be
overcome and the final voting outcome. An article published in
Europolitics illustrates and nicely sums up the kind of information
provided by newspapers in the course of negotiating the directive:
A majority of countries, led by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and
most of the new member states, want to roll back some of the MEPs’ changes
and ‘re-liberalise’ it somewhat. But there is a blocking minority, led by France
and Belgium, that wants to stick to the EP position. If the majority tries
to push through its agenda, the minority could scupper the whole Directive
on the grounds that no Directive is better than an ultra-liberal one. A key
member state to watch will be Germany, which has so far steered a fairly
middle course. With the new government of Chancellor Angela Merkel
pledging to re-inject life into the moribund German economy, it could be
lured into the majority camp.25
This short passage reveals substantial pieces of information on
the bargaining situation for this particular case. It highlights the
coalitions that have developed in the course of the process,
and it identifies the different blocks’ positions in relation to
the European Parliament. This brief example shows that news-
paper articles can be a vital source of information on the bargaining
process of EU decision-making. To date, this source is dramatically
underexploited.
23 http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/services-internal-market/article-
132241.
24 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-dir/index_en.htm.
25 ‘Informal Competitiveness Council: Services Directive Key Item at Graz
Ministerial’, Europolitics, 21 April 2006.
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Researchers studying the EU legislative processes need to move
on by opening up new data sources. The systematic analysis of news-
paper articles, linked to the use of primary documents issued by the
Council and by the other institutions, presents an important method
of significantly improving the data quality and furthering our under-
standing of how the EU really works. The Council of the European
Union is not such an opaque institution after all. The data is out
there; all we have to do is use it.
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